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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LARRY R. VONWALD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.

No. 940731-CA

KEVIN PLUMB,
Defendant-Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPgUANT
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is
based on a transfer from the Supreme Court of Utah
under Utah

Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 78-2a-3(2) (k)

(1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following is included as supplementing the
standard of appellate review part of paragraph 4.
under the heading STATEMENT OF ISSUES as contained
in appellant's opening brief, page 4. The question
there

presented

failure

to

relates

exercise

to

its

the

trial

discretion

court's
in

not

considering or ruling upon appellant's URCivP 11
sanctions.

The failure of the trial court to

exercise its discretion, and whether or not it
should have, presents a legal question subject to
review

for correctness.

Hatch, 877 P.2d

1241

Crossland

Savings v.

(Utah App. 1994), citing

Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818
F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1987).
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
1.
unambiguous

Contract
are

terms

interpreted

that

are

clear

according

and

to their

plain and ordinary meaning and extrinsic or parol
evidence is generally not admissible to explain the
intent of the parties.

Equitable Life and Cas.

Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App.
1993).
Appellee Plumb contends that the provision
"Buyer to pay for topographic study for property
and obtaining approval of building plans by Salt
Lake County within 30 days of seller providing
evidence of clear and marketable title" preceded by
"[s]pecial considerations and contingencies.

This

offer is made subject to the following special
conditions

and/or

contingencies

which

must

be

satisfied prior to closing:. . ." establishes that
county approval of appellee Plumb's building plans
is a condition precedent to closing.
Plumb argues

"[c]learly, obtaining

Appellee

approval of

building plans by Salt Lake County was a condition
2

precedent to closing. Otherwise, it would not have
been

included

in Section

7 which

specifically

listed "conditions and/or contingencies which must
be

satisfied

prior

Appellee, p. 9]

to

closing."

[Brief

of

In doing so appellee Plumb fails

to apply the plain and ordinary meaning rule.
Thus, Section 7 is labeled or headed

"special

considerations and contingencies - this offer is
made subject to the following special conditions
and/or contingencies which must be satisfied prior
to closing," but what follows after the label or
heading, interpreted according to its plain and
ordinary meaning, gives Plumb the discretion to
within 30 days of seller providing evidence of
clear

and

marketable

title,

to

pay

for

a

topographic study and obtain county approval and
possesses
terminology

none
of

of
the

the

characteristics

condition

appellee

or
Plumb

ascribes to it, does not implement the same, and
therefore the corollary legal consequences of a
condition precedent should not follow.

The nature

of the language used by appellee Plumb controls and
not the form of the printed label or heading.
3

2.

Appellee Plumb asserts in his brief that

he supported his motion for summary judgment with
affidavits

that

were

unopposed

by

appellant

VonWald; at the same time he asserts that the
contractual provisions at issue are unambiguous in
providing

that county

precedent

to

unambiguous

approval

closing.

If

"extrinsic

or

is a condition

the

contract

is

parol

evidence

is

generally not admissible to explain the intent of
the parties."

Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v.

Ross, 849 P. 2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993).

Appellant

VonWald agrees that the contract is unambiguous,
but unambiguous and did not provide for a condition
precedent as appellee claims.
Some

of

the

factual

assertions

appellee's brief require comment.
stated that

"Plumb submitted

made

in

At page 5 it is

the site plan to

William A. Marsh [], Section Manager, Salt Lake
County Development Services Division, for approval
[ ].

Marsh disapproved the site plan because the

slope of the driveway exceeded the county limits
[].

Without an approved site plan, Plumb could not
4

thereafter obtain an approved building plan. []"
Whether the site plan was submitted to the county
is questionable; submission to the county would
have to be in accordance with existing regulations
and there is no indication of what is required for
a site plan to be submitted "to the county."

It

would seem though that in this instance where Marsh
in his disapproval] of the driveway included in
the site plan, stated that the "[r]emainder of site
plan must be approved prior to issuance of a
building permit" the site plan was not submitted to
nor "rejected by the county."

[Brief of Appellee,

p. 5] In passing, it would appear that it would be
impossible if not impracticable, for the county to
give appropriate consideration or take action on a
site plan without knowing

something

about the

structure the site plan is designed to accommodate.
None of this is relevant [assuming the Court
agrees that the contract is unambiguous] except as
to appellee Plumb's good faith. Were the Court to
find that Section 7 establishes the existence of
the

condition

precedent

[county

approval

of

building plan] the inquiry does not end. Where the
5

performance of the contingency or condition is
within the control of a party to the agreement, the
party for whose benefit the condition precedent
runs is required to use "reasonable efforts11 to
have it occur.
The failure to perform a condition precedent
may be construed as a breach of contract. Hardin,
Rodriguez & Boivin v. Paradigm Ins., 962 F.2d 628
(7th Cir. 1992); Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Sec. 225(3).
The record is devoid of any facts showing that
appellee Plumb used reasonable efforts to satisfy
the requirements of the condition precedent he
claims exists before he canceled the contract.
The doctrine of good faith performance as it
relates to the covenant of fair dealing and good
faith imposes a limitation on the exercise of
discretion vested
contract.

In

in one of the parties to a

describing

the

nature

of

that

limitation the courts of this state have held that
a party vested with contractual discretion must
exercise that discretion reasonably and with proper
motive,

and

may

not
6

do

so

arbitrarily,

capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the
reasonable expectations of the parties.

S

Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp. f

t
811

P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc.,
812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991); Brown v. Weisr 871 P.2d
552 (Utah App. 1994).
Where county approval of building plans is
necessary is it in the discretion of appellee Plumb
to not make application for approval of building
plans but do what he did here, and thereby render
good faith performance? Appellee's own allegations
raise an inference of bad faith.
CONCLUSION
Appellant VonWald respectfully requests that
the order here appealed be in all things reversed
and the matter remanded for trial such remand be on
the basis indicated in appellant's opening brief.
DATED December 19, 1994.

On December 19, 1994, two copies of the
foregoing hand-delivered to Dennis K. Poole at 4543
7

South 700 East, Ste. 200, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111.
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